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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CHESTER WILLIAM WRIGHT,
Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Respondent.

Case No.
8615

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
From the admitted allegations of the complaint and
from the statements of counsel at pretrial of the evidence
he would introduce in behalf of his claim, plaintiff presented the following facts: That a collision occurred on
January 26, 1955, at approximately 8:35 P. M. at the intersection of Main Street and Robert Avenue in Salt Lake
City, Utah, between automobiles driven by the plaintiff
Wright, a highway patrolman, and the defendant's employee
Lambert; that immediately before the collision, the plain-
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tiff was proceeding north on Main Street in the outside
lane, that is, the lane nearest the east curb, at a speed which
he estimated at 30 to 35 miles per hour; that when Wright
was 90 feet away from the intersection he, for the first
time, observed defendant's automobile entering the intersection and applied his brakes, but because of an icy portion on the street not observed by him, the brakes failed to
hold and the car spun around from the outside lane closer
to the center of the road and crashed into defendant's vehicle ; that the point of impact occurred in the middle of
the intersection or barely over the center line of the intersection; that the road was clear and dry except for the ice
on which plaintiff skidded.
Defendant and respondent presented the following additional facts: That defendant's driver stopped at the stop
sign and, because of the building obstructing his view to
the south, proceeded forward at a slow rate and again
stopped slightly beyond the property line to look for oncoming traffic and then proceeded into the intersection at
a slow rate of speed-barely moving according to plaintiff
(R. 8) or not more than 3 to 4 miles per hour. Defendant
stated that the driver may not have stopped at the stop
sign first as the view to the south was obstructed, but if
he did not, he did stop slightly beyond the property line
where he could observe the traffic on Main Street. At the
time of the impact, Lambert had stopped or was proceeding
to stop his car and the impact occurred in the southwest
quadrant of the intersection, that is, in the south bound
traffic lanes on Main Street.
Hased on these facts, the trial court dismissed the case.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ADMITTED
FACTS FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND, FURTHER,
SAID FACTS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT, THAT NONE
OF THE ACTS OF DEFENDANT PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE ACCIDENT, AND
THAT THERE WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ADMITTED
FACTS FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND, FURTHER,
SAID FACTS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT, THAT NONE
OF THE ACTS OF DEFENDANT PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE ACCIDENT, AND
THAT THERE WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.

It is the position of respondent that the facts presented
as above set forth are insufficient to state a cause of action
against defendant and that no reasonable juror could con-
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elude on such facts that defendant was in any way liable
to plaintiff.
An intersection accident is involved here. The evidence
is uncontradicted that defendant's driver( Lambert stopped
before entering the intersection (R. 7, 10, 11) and that he
was in the intersection at a time when plaintiff was more
than 90 feet from the intersection (R. 7). Having stopped
before entering the intersection, Lambert was entitled to
proceed into the intersection and plaintiff was required to
yield the right-of-way to him. 41-6-74 (a), U. C. A. 1953;
Sn~ith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893; Hickock v. Skinner,
113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514. True, Lambert could not project
himself into a position of danger where there was an immediate hazard of collision, but there is no evidence here
that he did so nor was any such evidence offered. When
Lambert entered the intersection, plaintiff was more than
ninety feet away (plaintiff stated when he saw defendant
that defendant was in the intersection and plaintiff \vas
then 90 feet away (R. 7). Defendant did not race across
the intersection into the lane in which plaintiff was traveling in order to get across first as was the case in Bullock v.
Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350, but proceeded slowly and
cautiously at not more than three to four miles an hour or
barely moving as stated by plaintiff (R. 8). As is the case
with most motorists, Lambert apparently believed in giving
police cars a wide berth. The Highway Patrol car was
traveling in the outside lane on the opposite side of the
street from defendant's vehicle and Lambert was entitled
to assume that he would stay there. Surely, he cannot be
charged with knowing that plaintiff would slam on his
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brakes, hit some ice and spin from one lane to another.
Indeed, since the impact occurred in the southwest quadrant
of the intersection or (giving plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt) in the center of the intersection or barely east of
the center (R. 10) and defendant had stopped or was stopping at the time (R. 7), it appears that defendant was prepared to let plaintiff pass on the outside lane before proceeding further across the intersection.
Plaintiff argues that there is no definite evidence that
defendant's driver stopped before entering the intersection,
but apparently the statements at Page 11 of the Record were
overlooked:
"He [Lambert] either stopped at the stop sign
first and then stopped again slightly beyond the
property line, or he stopped slightly beyond the
property line without first stopping at the stop
sign."
We may concede that defendant's obligation to stop
before entering the intersection required him to stop at a
point where he could observe the traffic yet the record
shows that this was done (R. 11, 7, 10).
Coming now to plaintiff's actions, he was proceeding,
according to his own statement, at 30 to 35 miles per hour.
This is in excess of the speed limit established by Sec. 416-46(b) (2), U. C. A. 1953. Since there is no evidence of
unusual circumstances or a higher speed limit lawfully
created by proper authorities, this speed constitutes negligence on the part of Patrolman Wright as a matter of law.
Jensen v. Utah Light & Rwy. Co., 42 Utah 415, 132 P. 8.
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Finally, even, assuming plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent, at most the evidence shows that the accident was
unavoidable. As has been pointed out previously, the Highway Patrol car was traveling in the outside lane. In the
ordinary course of events, Patrolman Wright would and
should have stayed in that lane especially after observing
Lambert coming from the opposite side of the street. But,
when he put on his brakes, he ran onto an icy stretch of
paven1ent and the car spun away from the outside lane and
at least to the center of the roadway where the impact occurred. Had the patrol car not spun on the ice, it would
have passed defendant without any collision. Defendant at
the time was stopped or stopping in the center as plaintiff
states or on the west side of the road as defendant states.
In either event, the patrol car in the easternmost lane would
have passed by without incident had it not been for the spin
on the ice, ice which according to the evidence neither party
could have foreseen. But for the skid propelling the patrol
car out of the outside lane, there would have been no accident.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we contend the judgment
of the court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
H. R. WALDO, JR.,
of Ray, Rawlins, Jones &
Henderson,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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